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NOTE
A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE WATER TREATY OF 1944 *
In a recent conference on environmental problems common to
the United States and Mexico, 1 the 1944 Water Utilization Treaty
between the United States and Mexico received extensive
consideration, primarily with reference to the salinity problems in
the Lower Colorado River area. One question which emerged
from the discussion, but was never satisfactorily answered, is how
and why the Treaty came into being. Considering its apparent
failure to materially assist in the resolution of serious conflicts
over water utilization, such as the salinity problem, the agreement does not seem to be in the best interests of Mexico-the
party currently encountering difficulties over the Treaty's implementation. And the terms themselves are markedly one-sided
in favor of the United States. Moreover, the Treaty could be
judged defective by reference to a technical definition of treaties,
in that its inefficacy may indicate the lack of "mutual declarations
of will . . . which coincide as to the desired effects of the
2
instrument."
This note is an attempt to discover why Mexico signed this
agreement, despite all its flaws. An answer can be found, it is
submitted, in the records of the negotiations leading up to the
drafting of the Treaty; these records indicate a3 strong possibility
that Mexico had virtually no choice but to sign.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY

The Treaty was the product of over twenty years of negotiations consisting of informal diplomatic discussions as well as
*Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (1946), T.S. No. 994 (effective Nov. 8,
1945) [hereinafter cited as TREATY].
1. Pollution and Political Boundaries: United States - Mexican Environmental Problems,
Conference of April 29, 1972, U. of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
[Conference papers reprinted in this volume].
2. i. Detter, Essays on the Law of Treaties 14 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Letter from the Ambassador in Mexico to the Under Secretary of State, [1943] 6
Foreign Rel. U.S. 611-12 (1965); Letter from Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of the
American Republics to the Advisor on Political Relations, [ 19431 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 628 (1965),
"[A]II things considered, they need a treaty more than we do." [Hereinafter cited as Letters.
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meetings and studies pursuant to acts of the United States
Congress. 4 To a certain extent it also appears to have descended
from the Rio Grande Convention of 1906, 5 a similar but more
limited agreement between the United States and Mexico. The
historical setting at the time of the enactment of the 1944 Treaty
can be fairly described as tense or even critical as a result of a
protracted period of confrontation between the two nations over
a number of problems, not the least of which was the expropriation of American oil properties in Mexico. 6 Thus, apart from
the inherent difficulties in the subject matter of the Water Treaty,
it is understandable that agreement could not easily be reached
even after years of maneuvering, notwithstanding all references
to the Good Neighbor policy and cooperation between Mexico
and the United States.7 In addition, the strength of the competing
interests in the use of the international river waters made
settlement of the controversy nearly impossible.
Clearly, if there were to be a treaty at all, there would have to
be some compromise; both nations desired to continue their
agricultural development in the Southwest by irrigation, and the
water supply was definitely limited. However, when the
breakthrough finally came there was no question about who was
the victor. The full measure of the sacrifice Mexico was forced to
make has only recently come to light in the context of the
Colorado River salinity problem, as Mexico has discovered just
how ephemeral are the few rights and remedies thought to have
been acquired by her under this Treaty. These remedies,
theoretically enforceable by a good faith interpretation of the
Treaty, 8 have been regarded as purely voluntary and gratuitous
4. Statement by the United States Commissioner (Lawson), United States Section, International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico, Jan. 25, 1945, Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Water Treaty with Mexico Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 155-56 (1945) [Reprinted in 3 M.
Whiteman, Digest of International Law 945-47 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Statement by Lawson];
International Boundary and Water Commission Act, 22 U.S.C. 277-77d: Act of May 13, 1924, ch.
153.43 Stat. 118; Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 381, 44 Stat. 1403; Act of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 561, 49
Stat. 660; Act of June 28, 1941, ch. 259, 55 Stat. 303, 338.
5. Convention with Mexico Concerning the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 (1907), T.S. No. 455 (effective Jan. 16
1907).
6. See, e.g., Letter from the Ambassador in Mexico to the Secretary of State, [1940] 5 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 1040 (1961).
7. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Mexican Ambassador to the Department of State, [1941] 7
Foreign Rel. U.S. 376 (1962).
8. Sobarzo, The Salinity of the Colorado River and the Interpretationof Treaties, 12 Natural
Resources J. 5 10 (Oct., 1972) [hereinafter cited as Sobarzo].
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measures, to the extent that they have been acknowledged at all
by the United States.9
CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

There are relatively few sections of the Treaty which have
given rise to most of the difficulties encountered in its implementation. In order to understand their significance, it is necessary to
begin with a brief overview of the contents and purposes of the
Treaty as a whole.
According to the Preamble of the Treaty, its express purpose is
to allocate between the two nations the rights to waters of the Rio
Grande or Rio Bravo, Tijuana, and Colorado Rivers for uses
other than navigation. It is to "fix and delimit" those rights "in
order to obtain the most complete and satisfactory utilization" of
the waters "in the interests of both countries. . . ." Moreover,
the Treaty is said to be undertaken in "the sincere spirit of
cordiality and friendly cooperation which happily governs the
relations between them. . . ." Most of this language should
probably be disregarded as mere rhetoric, but it nevertheless
contains the most explicit reference to the main purpose-a
"complete and satisfactory utilization" by both Mexico and the
United States. No indication is given in the Preamble that the
utilization by the United States is to be considered invariably
more important than that by Mexico, although the body of the
Treaty might suggest such a principle implicitly governs. Perhaps
this is because it was indeed foremost in the minds of the persons
who drafted the Treaty, that is, the members of the United States
Department of State. 10
9. Reference is made here to the measures undertaken pursuant to Minutes 218 and 241 of the
International Boundary and Water Commission, to ameliorate the Wellton-Mohawk situation,
and to proposals of the United States Bureau of Reclamation for future reduction of the naturally
accruing salinity from the Upper Colorado River. These measures and proposals are discussed
extensively in two.of the papers presented at the recent conference on United States-Mexican
environmental problems, supra note I; Gantz, United States Approaches to Salinity Problems on
the Colorado River, 12 Natural Resources J. 496 (Oct., 1972) [hereinafter cited as Gantz]; and
Reynolds, The Water Quality Problem on the Colorado River, 12 Natural Resources J. 481
[hereinafter cited as Reynolds]. The position is taken in both papers that none of the actions by
the United States were or could have been dictated by the provisions of the Treaty, much less by
general principles of international law.
10. See, e.g., Memorandum From the Department of State, [19421 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 561
(1963), "Based upon the best data presently available, the total virgin flow of the river . . . can
all be beneficially used in the United States"; Memorandum by the Legal Adviser to Mr. Charles
A. Timm of the Division of the American Republics, [194316 Foreign Rel. U.S. 619 (1965), "[W]e
would probably argue . . . that we have a right to use all waters having their source in the
United States . . .";and Memorandum from Department of State to the Mexican Ambassador,
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The body of the Treaty consists of seven parts, only three of
which need be mentioned here: that dealing with the distribution, control, and development of the Colorado River,"1 that
pertaining to the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo),' 2 and a short section
dealing with the Tijuana River. 13
Probably the most controversial passages in the Treaty have
been those, purportedly related to the matter of water quality:
Articles III, IV, X andXI.' 4 Prior to the enactment of the Treaty,
the question of water quantity was of primary importance to both
nations and was, in fact, the main reason for the Treaty. 15 Now,
however, since both nations have been committed by the Treaty
to certain numerically precise quantities, the only opportunity
either country has for improving its condition is through favorable interpretation of the alleged water quality provisions of the
16
Treaty.
Article III states that there is an order of preferences for joint
water use which the International Boundary and Water Commission must follow in any decisions it makes regarding such use.
Since agriculture and stock-raising are second on the list, with
only domestic and municipal uses having a higher priority,
Mexico has taken the position that the allocations of water to
Mexico must be at least of a quality suitable or adequate for
these two categories, particularly if the water supply is insufficient
to satisfy the requirements for all six of the specified uses.' 7 Since
both nations acknowledge that there is insufficient water to meet
all possible uses,' 8 this would appear to be a reasonable
[1942] 3 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 952 (1964), "It is thus apparent that any
waters allocated to Mexico over and above the return waters present in the river at the
international boundary must operate to restrict proportionately the ultimate development within
the United States."
II. TREATY, at art. X-XV.
12. Id. at art. IV-IX.
13. Id. at art. XVI.
14. Attempts to resolve the crisis brought on by the increase in salinity of the Lower Colorado
River have been directed at least partially toward interpreting the Treaty so as to find in it
provisions which do (do not) require the United States to mitigate the salinity condition. See, e.g..
Sobarzo, supra note 8, at 511, and Gantz, supra note 9, at 498.
15. [1940] 5 Foreign Rel. U.S. 1029 ff. (1961); [1941] 7 id. 378 ff., 384 ff. (1962); [194216 id. 547
ff. (1963); [1943] 6 id. 592 ff. (1965). See, e.g., Letter from the Under Secretary of State to the
Mexican Ambassador, [1939] 5 id. 1029(1961).
16. This follows from the fact that water quality requirements directly determine the quantity
of usable water to which a nation would be entitled under the Treaty.
17. Sobarzo, supra note 8, at 511.
18. Id.; Memorandum by Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of the American Republics to
the Adviser on Political Relations, [1943] 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 603 (1965), "The [Mexican]
memorandum is on pretty sound ground when it notes that if costs be disregarded the United
States could eventually use double the supply of the river."
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argument for the position that the only water Mexico is allocated
must not fall below that quality required for agriculture. However, it is questionable whether Article III was intended to refer to
the water allocated to the individual countries at all, since that
was already clearly specified elsewhere in the Treaty. 19
Articles X and XI, relating to the quantities of water allocated
to Mexico from the Colorado River, are brought forth by one
United States commentator 20 as evidence that Mexico explicitly
agreed to accept water of any quality. The phrases, "Of the
waters of the Colorado River, from any and all sources . . ."21
and "of the waters of the said river, whatever their origin . . .,,12
are considered, in his view, to mean all water including drainage-whether natural or artificially developed-and perhaps even
industrial wastes (although he explicitly avoids pushing the
argument that far), such that Mexico has no grounds for
complaint about the increasingly saline condition of the Colorado River.2 3 Mexican commentators, on the other hand, argue that
the absence of any reference to a right to provide Mexico with
polluted water is no more persuasive of the existence of a right to
pollute than is the absence of clauses assuring to Mexico a supply
of unpolluted water.2 4 In other words, their position is that no
inference regarding water quality can legitimately be drawn from
the Treaty wording per se, except for the suggestion raised by
Article III (if applicable to this matter.) They argue further that
an interpretation of the terms of the Treaty in the light of its
purpose yields the inference that the water must at least be
appropriate or usable for the purposes indicated in the Preamble.2 5
An objective analysis of the Treaty language in question could
bring one to the conclusion that the American commentator is
making too literal an interpretation of those phrases if it is
considered that they could in actuality refer to the naturalsources
of the river, such as springs, tributaries, precipitation, and so
forth. However, there is one other passage in the Treaty which
19. TREATY, art. IV-IX, X-XV.
20. Gantz, supra note 9, at 498.
21. TREATY, art. X.
22. Id. art. X .
23. Gantz, supra note 9, at 499.
24. Sepulveda, The International Water Quality Problems Between Mexico and the United
States: Prospects and Perspectives, 12 Natural Resources J. 488, 489 (Oct. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Sepulveda]; Sobarzo, supra note 8, at 511.
25. Sepulveda, id. at 489; Sobarzo, supra note 8, at 512.
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argues against this conclusion and in favor of the view that those
phrases do signify the non-obligation of the United States with
respect to water quality: that is Article IV, Section A(a), relating
to Rio Grande waters to be delivered to Mexico. This section
refers to "All of the waters reaching the main channel of the Rio
Grande (Rio Bravo) from the San Juan and Alamo Rivers,
including the return flow from the lands irrigatedfrom the latter
two rivers." (Emphasis added). This passage, together with the
absence of similar language in that part of Article IV allocating
water to the United States, tends to support the argument 26 that
all of the supposed water-quality language was intentionally
included, and furthermore, was intended to be taken quite
literally.
This argument does not demonstrate anything about Mexico's
concurrence in the selection of the language in question, despite
references by United States commentators to the Senate Hearings
on ratification of the Treaty and to the comments of various
United States senators and officials as to Mexico's understanding
of the consequences of the wording. 27 No doubt Mexico was
painfully aware of all this (though she may be understandably
reluctant to admit it in the context of the present controversy 28 ),
but the circumstances of enactment of the Treaty were such that
Mexico apparently had no hope whatsoever of contesting the
inclusion of the language, the primary concern at that time being
29
to obtain water in any form.
In the interpretation of particular treaty passages, it is customary to refer to general principles of international law to clarify
the meaning of a section of a treaty, if there is nothing in the
convention itself to assist in the interpretation. Here the argument is made by the United States commentator that the
meaning of the passage is perfectly clear, 30 but this is true only if
the view is accepted that a correct interpretation of an agreement
can be one that is unreasonable in light of the intent of the
parties and their manifest purpose. If this were the position the
United States meant to take on this Treaty, the argument would
violate not only general principles of international law but also
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Gantz, supra note 9, at 499.
Id. at 498.
See, e.g., Sepulveda, supra note 24, at 489.
See, e.g., Letters, supra note 3.
Gantz, supra note 9, at 499.
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the law of the United States. In the case of Hidalgo County Water
Control and Irrigation District v. Hedrick, it was held, with
reference to this very Treaty: "The rule for construction of
treaties has been thus stated: 'Treaties are to be construed as
other contracts according to the intent of the parties . . . and so
as to carry out their manifest purpose.' "31 In Board of County
Commissioners v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, S.A. is found: "We
proceed also under the admonition that where a treaty admits of
two constructions, one restrictive of and the other favorable to
rights claimed under it, the latter is to be preferred. '32 This
holding clearly applies to the present discussion if it is assumed
that the rights to be protected are Mexico's rights to receive water
usable for agriculture.
On the other hand, the United States position is not without
merit when it is considered that any obligations the United States
is construed to have regarding the provision to Mexico of
non-saline water will necessarily create either a financial or a
water-use burden. That is, the United States will either have to
spend money for the construction of desalinization facilities of
some type, or else suffer a diminution of its own water-use rights,
since part of its supply would have to be wasted to dilute the
waters given to Mexico. This same problem is present with
respect to interstate water compacts, and cannot easily be
resolved. 33 Even recourse to international law is not much help
here, since it merely suggests that the needs of the parties be
weighed and the rights to water distributed on an equitable basis
in accordance with those needs, with prior agreements, with
projected development, and various other highly subjective
factors. 34 Thus it cannot be considered exclusively an act of bad
faith for a nation to protest an interpretation of a treaty which, in
effect, would require it to forego part of its water rights to assure
a downstream nation equally pure water. Such a protest is at least
partially a recognition of the fact that there is no easy solution to
the problem of the relative rights of co-riparians, particularly in
areas such as the Southwest where the scarcity of water makes the
31. 226 F.2d 1, 7(5th Cir. 1955).
32. 307 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. Reynolds, supra note 9, at 485.
34. See, e.g., Principles of Law and Recommendations on the Uses of International Rivers:
Submitted to the International Committee of the International Law Assoc. by the Comm. on the
Uses of Waters of International Rivers of the Amer. Branch at New York University Conference,
Principle 11 (1958) at 3.

October 19721

THE WA TER TREATY OF 1944

accruing" saline pollution more severe
problem of "naturally
35
than elsewhere.
On balance, then, a "plain-meaning" or literal interpretation of
the disputed passages of this Treaty, as advocated by United
States officials, 36 results in a situation which is manifestly unfair
to Mexico, whose intent and purpose in joining in the Treaty was
to obtain water for agricultural purposes. 37 It cannot be argued
that Mexico would have voluntarily submitted itself to a future
obstacle of this nature. By the same token, it is unlikely that the
United States intended to submit itself to a convention which
would ultimately require it to sacrifice part of the share of water
it had secured. Unquestionably, the issues of water quality and of
the quantities of water allocated present examples of non-agreement which are so fundamental to this Treaty as to render it
meaningless, at least as a potential source of remedies for
grievances between the parties. Why, then, was the Treaty
signed?
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE 1944
WATER TREATY WAS SIGNED

There are at least six matters to discuss in evaluating the
conditions under which Mexico signed this Treaty. First, what
actually precipitated the agreement at the particular moment in
time, when negotiations had been going on for such a long period
before, with no real breakthrough in sight? Second, were the
terms of the Treaty actually agreed upon ("bargained for") in full
by both parties? Third, who were the actual moving parties to the
Treaty: was it a straightforward negotiation between two nations,
or were there other interests involved which may have shifted the
balance of the negotiations? Fourth, were the parties (whatever
their true identity) on a fairly equal footing in their relations
concerning the Treaty, or were there unfair advantages on one
side? Fifth, were all the terms of the Treaty, whether or not truly
agreed upon, in harmony with principles of national and
international law? And, finally, did both parties act throughout
the negotiations with the good-faith intention of developing a just
and equitable agreement?
There is reason to believe (despite the United States' official
35. Reynolds. supra note 9, at 484.
36. Gantz, supra note 9, at 499..
37. See, e.g., Letters, supra note 3.
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disbelief3 8) that Mexico was forced finally to agree to the United
States' maximum water allowance figures, and thereby open the
way for the completion of a treaty, by a drought which occurred
in the Mexicali Valley in the spring of 1943. 39 This drought was
so severe that Mexico was forced to buy water to meet its
immediate irrigation needs in that area; worse still, this water had
to be purchased from the Imperial Valley Irrigation District at
exorbitant rates. 40 When problems with delivery of the water
developed, Mexico sought help from the State Department,
which was apparently unresponsive. 41 Finally, out of desperation,
Mexico let it be known it would try to negotiate directly with
President Roosevelt on the matter, or else resolve it through the
enactment of a treaty, if possible. 42
As noted above, the State Department presented itself as
skeptical of the whole matter, but was apparently not pleased
with the involvement of the Imperial Valley Irrigation District. 43
This District was one of the California water and power interests
which were making the United States negotiations with Mexico
more difficult by the rigidity of their demands for the protection
of their own established uses of the Colorado River. 44 Ironically,
this same organization, a California public corporation, had a
concession for agricultural production in the Lower Colorado
area of Mexico, through its subsidiary, Cia. de Terrenos y Aguas
de la Baja California, S.A., 45 that it may be assumed that it was

not unconcerned with what potential Mexico held for it. These
comments, of course, relate also to the third point, discussed
below: that there may have been more parties to the Treaty than
just Mexico and the United States.
The terms of the Treaty, as has already been suggested, by
their very nature give rise to the suspicion that they are not a
close approximation of what Mexico might have been expected
to agree to had a genuine compromise taken place. The terms
38. Letter from the Under Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico, [1943] 6 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 615 (1965); Memorandum by Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of the American
Republics to the Adviser on Political Relations, [194316 Foreign Rel. U.S. 615 (1965).
39. Letters, supra note 3, at 611.
40. Id. at611-12.
41. Id. at 611.
42. Id. at 612-13.
43. Id. at 612.
44. Memorandum by the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of
State, [ 1943] 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 610 (1965).
45. Memorandum from the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs, [1943] 6 Foreign Rel. U.S.
600 n. 22 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
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relating to water quantity, which were without a doubt the most
important parts of the Treaty from Mexico's point of view, might
have been subject to further modification, if Mexico had not been
forced to capitulate altogether. This is because Mexico had two
point in its favor: potential control over most of the water of the
Rio Grande in certain areas, 46 and an apparent willingness to
submit the whole water question to outside arbitration, 47 a
48
prospect which the United States, however, did not share.
Throughout the period of negotiations, the United States consistently bargained for a lower and lower figure, one far less than
what Mexico seriously believed was essential to a reasonable
level of agricultural development. 49 Mexico finally had to accept
a figure that the United States interests had previously decided
on as an absolute maximum,50 and which was substantially less
than Mexico's most conservative estimate of the minimum
needed to support its reasonable present and future agricultural
needs.5 1 It is possible, therefore, that the terms might have been
different with respect to water quantity if Mexico had been able
to delay long enough to initiate arbitration.
In the matter of water quality, as already noted, it is doubtful
Mexico had any say whatever in the final terms of the Treaty.
The pressure it was under probably caused all its efforts to be
directed to the question of quantity. Because of the drought it
could not afford to press the issue of water quality at that time,
although it cannot seriously be doubted that the topic was on the
minds of the negotiators on both sides. 52 Perhaps, as Sr.
Sepulveda suggested, 53 insistence on dealing with that topic
would have created such firm resistance on the part of the United
46. Id. at 597.
47. Letter from the Charge in Mexico to the Adviser on Political Relations, [1943] 6 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 594 (1965).
48. Letter from the Adviser on Political Relations to the Charge in Mexico, [1943] 6 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 605 (1965).
49. See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 45, at 600-01.
50. Letter from the Adviser on Political Relations to the Counselor of Embassy in Mexico,
[1943] 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 618 (1965).
51. Memorandum, supra note 45, at 600-01.
52. See, e.g., Sepulveda, supra note 24, at 489; Gantz, supra note 9, at 498: Letter from Mr.
Charles A. Timm of the American Republics to the Adviser on Political Relations, [1943] 6
Foreign Rel. U.S. 627 (1965), "The major difficulty centers . .. around the effort of the
Mexicans to find loopholes by which they could demand virtually all of the 1,500,000 acre-feet at
points above the lower boundary, thus insuring, first, that most of the allocation would be
"
practically fresh water ....
53. Sepulveda, supra note 24, at 490.

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

States that there would have been no treaty at all, and this was
not a possibility Mexico could afford to consider.
The degree of control the United States had over this aspect of
the Treaty is revealed in the remarks of Mr. Frank Clayton,
Counsel for the United States Section of the International
Boundary Commission before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, when he said: "The representatives of the United
States insisted upon those words in the treaty. They were
objected to by Mexico. . . ."54 but were nevertheless incorporated. It is interesting to note that Canada, too, in the negotiation of
its boundary waters treaty with the United States, 55 had occasion
to experience such insistence on the part of the United States as
to the terms of the Treaty. Canada's acquiescence to the
insistence was explained by the Prime Minister as follows: "I, for
my part, have always believed that the Americans are very good
and very fair neighbors, but they always stand for their own view
of things and in this matter they did. It was no use to argue with
56
them."
The matter of the identity of the parties to the Treaty is
possibly one of the most significant factors, both in determining
what the terms of the Treaty were to be and in relation to the
economic conditions which made capitulation by Mexico necessary. It was indicated above 57 that at least one California water
interest was involved in Mexico's agricultural economy, both by
selling water and by actually operating and developing farm
lands. Thus it is reasonable to assume it had an interest in and
possibly some influence over Mexico's decisions regarding the
Treaty. 58 The California interests were also influential in the
decisions of the United States. Together with the other Colorado
River Basin States, they helped determine the water quantity
54. Hearings on the Water Treaty with Mexico Before the Senate Comm.on Foreign Relations,
Sess., pt. 1,at 7 (1945), quoted also in Gantz, supra note 9, at 498.
79th Cong., Ist
55. Treaty with Canada Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the
Boundaries Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11,1909, 35 Stat. 2448 (1911), T.S. No.
548.
56. Remarks of Sir Wilfred Laurier, P.M., House of Commons Debates, Sess. 1910-1911, vol. I,
at 869-913, quoted in McDougall, The Development of International Law with Respect to
Trans-Boundary Water Resources: Co-operation for Mutual Advantage or Continentalism's Thin
Edge of the Wedge? 9Osgoode Hall Law i. 261 (1971) at 268 [hereinafter cited as McDougall].
57. Letters, supra note 3;Memorandum, supra note 45.
58. That this was at least suspected by the United States officials is indicated by the comment,
"It would seem that both the Imperial District and the Mexicans need careful watching,"
Memorandum by Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of the American Republics to the Adviser
on Political Relations [1943]6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 615 (1965).
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terms and the purposes of the Treaty, one of which was to put a
limit on Mexico's development.5 9 Although the identity of these
"interests" was known to Mexico, it was a matter which was
treated confidentially by the State Department. 60 This put
Mexico at the disadvantage of being prevented from confronting
its true adversaries.
There was quite definitely an inequality in the bargaining
positions of the parties, above and beyond the situation of the
extreme pressure of the drought which ultimately compelled
Mexico to come to agreement on a basis not chosen by it. This
inequality was manifested in several ways, not the least of which
was the location of the United States as the upstream riparian;
there was also its greater amount of technical expertise and
resources (claimed, 61 though not satisfactorily demonstrated), its
greater financial investment as of that time in flood control and
storage projects (which it argued gave it a greater right to the use
of the water as well as to the determination of the contents of the
Treaty), 62 and its head-start in agricultural development in the
Southwest-which was evidently considered a strong reason for
preferential use of the water at that time and in the future. 63 The
only special advantages Mexico had were those already cited: 64
its location as the upstream riparian on part of the Rio Grande,
and its willingness to submit the water question to an outside
arbitral body. It should be reiterated that the probable reason for
Mexico's failure to capitalize on these two advantages was the
factor of the drought which gave the United States an additional
advantage. It resulted in a practically unbeatable combination of
bargaining tools for the United States, and the results were
almost inevitable under the circumstances.
The last two factors were the presence in the Treaty of
provisions contrary to accepted principles of international law
(the Harmon Doctrine in various disguises) and the failure of the
United States to demonstrate good faith in the enactment of the
59. Statement by Lawson, supra note 4, at 946.
60. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico, [194117 Foreign Rel.
U.S. 384 (1962).
61. See, e.g., Memorandum by Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of the American
Republics to the Adviser on Political Relations, [194316 Foreign Rel. U.S. 603, 6 (4)-(5), (1965).
62. See, e.g., Memorandum by the Legal Adviser to Mr. Charles A. Timm of the Division of
the American Republics, [1943] 6 Foreign Rel. U.S. 619 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [1943] 6 Foreign
Rel. U.S. 597 (1965).
64. Id.; and supra note 47.
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Treaty. These have a bearing not only on the circumstances of
enactment but also on the quality of the agreement which
emerged. They are factors which can still be observed in the form
and the implementation of the Treaty.
In effect, the Treaty language incorporates the United States'
perpetual theme in its international water law: the concept, once
called the Harmon Doctrine after the individual who made it
notorious in the early 1900's, that a nation by virtue of its
sovereignty has an inherent right to use, use up, waste, and
control for its own benefit exclusively, any water which happens
to flow through its territory. This doctrine ". . . represented the
extreme of nationalistic positions .... unorthodox ...in comparison with . . . international law." 65 This doctrine makes
possible more than mere territorial control, however; it also gives
the striking economic advantage of "underpricing the cost of
development" by ignoring the costs to the downstream users.
That is, it makes possible "...
shifting the diseconomies of
'66
development.
If this was ever justifiable under any circumstances, it is no
longer, particularly not in an area such as the Southwest where
only an equitable basis for sharing can possibly satisfy the
requirements of international law. Nowhere in any of the current
attempts to codify and restate international river law does any
principle resembling the unmodified Harmon Doctrine appear.67
With regard to the failure of the United States to contract the
Treaty in good faith, the obvious contrast between the Treaty
preamble and its body suggests the tenor of the United States'
dealings throughout the negotiations. If "good faith" implies
honesty in some form, it would appear that it was lacking on the
part of the United States. For example, at one point a memorandum was written by the Assistant Chief of the Division of the
American Republics relating to the fact that, while one branch of
the government had been trying to cut down on Mexican water
use through the treaty negotiations, another branch was responsible for encouraging certain agricultural development projects
which would ultimately require an increase in the use of
irrigation water by Mexico if the projects were to be continued. 68
65. McDougall, supra note 56, at 264.
66. Id. at 266.
67. See, e.g., Sepulveda, supra note 24, at 493-94.
68. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of American Republics, [1943] 6
Foreign Rel. U.S. 620 (1965).
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Another example is a memorandum of the Legal Adviser of the
Department of State warning that the United States ought not
operate on the basis of the Harmon Doctrine: "[W]e areprecluded from assuming a dog-in-the-manger attitude. In other
words, we cannot with good grace answer Mexico by saying that
we have captured the water and have a right to divert it within
the United States regardless of Mexico's interest...."69 This
memorandum, giving advice on the legality of the actions of the
United States during the negotiations, appeared at a time when
the "dog-in-the-manger" attitude was still characteristic of the
United States and of its "interests" in their attempts through the
Treaty to control all the water.
CONCLUSION

One of the purposes of this note was to indicate some of the
background of the 1944 Water Treaty, and to suggest why it was
enacted; there now appears to be good reason for believing
Mexico was compelled by the drought of 1943 to commit itself to
70
this particular Treaty.
This Treaty is not a matter of purely historical interest,
however; it is at the center of problems being faced at this very
moment by Mexico and the United States. 71 It is appropriate,
therefore, to consider what alternative means are available for
solving these problems, since it appears the Treaty has not been
and will not be especially useful.
A number of suggestions have been made, 72 relating to the
Treaty, its enforcement mechanism, and even to general principles of international law, concerning possible ways of settling the
current dispute and preventing future ones. It is the opinion of
the writer that these suggestions, some of which may ultimately
prove useful to a certain extent, nevertheless do not address the
main factor at the core of these water disputes: the economic
69. Memorandum by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, 3 M. Whiteman, Digest of
International Law 953 (1964).
70. Numerous passages have been cited already, but the following further confirm what has
been indicated. "They said that if there were a water agreement so ardently to be hoped for they
should be getting this water for nothing," Letter from the Ambassador in Mexico to the Under
Secretary of State, [194316 Foreign Rel. U.S. 611 (1965); "There is no doubt as to the importance
of this matter and . . . there is in my mind no doubt that we should make possible the delivery
of this water this season. I can assure you that they [the Mexicans] were not staging a show for
me ...
" id. at 612.
7 1. See, Epilogue, 12 Natural Resources J. 578 (1972).
72. See, e.g.. Sepulveda, supra note 24, at 495.
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imbalance between the two nations. It seems that all discussions
limited to a legal approach will likewise fail in arriving at an
answer which would have some effect on the actual conduct of
the two nations. The first step will have to be a determination of a
workable method for balancing the competing interests in a
scarce natural resource. Until this step is taken, in the form of the
creation of an international, and perhaps continental, water
allocation and development plan, there is little hope of putting an
end to the classic struggle between the "haves" and the "havenots."
KIRSTEN J. ANDERSON

